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Abstract
I present a model of competition between two market makers who are
horizontally differentiated. I first show that absent a search market for
buyers and sellers, there is a continuum of symmetric equilibria. These
equilibria are payoff equivalent for market makers, but affect buyers’ and
sellers’ welfare in opposite ways. Second, I analyze the model when buyers
and sellers can also exchange the good in search markets. The model
with search markets shares many features with existing models, yet allows
competing intermediaries to net a profit in equilibrium. Interestingly, the
model exhibits a complementarity between intermediaries’ profits in the
presence of search markets. Third, I show that every equilibrium in a game
with market makers is also an equilibrium in an appropriately defined game
with matchmakers.
Keywords: Market making, intermediation and search, horizontal differ-
entiation, market microstructure.
JEL-Classification: C72, D41, D43, L13.
1 Introduction
I analyze imperfect competition between market makers who are horizontally
differentiated. I study both the cases where they face competition from search
markets and where they do not. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first
paper to address horizontal differentiation between market makers in the pres-
ence of search markets. Spulber (1999, p.68-71) analyzes Bertrand competition
between market making intermediaries that are horizontally differentiated. He
shows that market makers net a profit in equilibrium if they are differentiated,
∗Economics Department, University of Bern, Schanzeneckstrasse 1, CH-3001 Bern. Phone:
+41 31 631 80 78. Email: simon.loertscher@vwi.unibe.ch. I want to thank Alain Egli, Patrick
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but he does not analyze the case when intermediaries face competition from
search markets. Moreover, his analysis is stripped down in that it takes as
given the demand and supply functions facing the intermediaries, rather than
deriving them explicitly from a model like Hotelling (1929)’s or Salop (1979)’s.
The following definition of a market maker is taken from the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC):1
A ”market maker” is a firm that stands ready to buy and sell a
particular stock on a regular and continuous basis at a publicly
quoted price.2
This definition of market maker is narrow insofar as it is strictly confined to
a dealer in stock exchanges. In a broader sense, market makers encompass
all firms that buy and sell goods at publicly observable bid and ask prices in
order to make profits.3 According to this broader definition, intermediaries in
job and housing markets and travel agents are considered as market makers,
too.4 Moreover, since retailers and supermarkets intermediate between produc-
ers and consumers, they act as market makers as well. Though I assume that
intermediation is costless, it is straightforward to extend the model to account
for costly production when the intermediaries use a one-to-one technology that
transforms one unit of input into one unit of output. So, all firms that set
public prices both on the input and on the output market can be subsumed as
market makers. In particular, merchants typically are market makers.
For the case of homogenous goods, Bertrand competition between market
makers has been analyzed by Stahl (1988), Gehrig (1993), Fingleton (1997),
Spulber (1999) and Rust and Hall (2003).5 Ju et al. (2004) and Loertscher
1http://www.sec.gov/answers/mktmaker.htm.
2The quote goes on: ”Many OTC stocks have more than one market-maker. You’ll most
often hear about market makers in the context of the Nasdaq or other ”over the counter”
(OTC) markets. Market makers that stand ready to buy and sell stocks listed on an exchange,
such as the New York Stock Exchange, are called ”third market makers”. Market-makers
generally must be ready to buy and sell at least 100 shares of a stock they make a market in.
As a result, a large order from an investor may have to be filled by a number of market-makers
at potentially different prices.”
3The requirement for publicity of prices is what distinguishes market makers from other
intermediaries who are sometimes called middlemen and who trade at prices that are only
privately communicated, e.g., after a buyer or seller has contacted the middleman by phone.
4Job and housing market intermediaries typically do not buy the goods. Thus, they are
more like matchmakers (or platforms) who facilitate or enable matches between a seller and
a buyer, whereas travel agents buy travels and therefore stand ready to sell; see section 6 for
a discussion of the similarities and differences of market makers and matchmakers.
5Spulber (1996) develops a model in which price setting firms intermediate between buyers
and sellers. However, in his model prices are not public information. Instead, a buyer or a
seller learns a firm’s price only if matched to that firm in the search market. Adhering to
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(2005) analyze price competition between market makers when goods are ho-
mogeneous and market makers set capacity constraints prior to competing in
prices (see also Kremer and Polkovnichenko, 2000).6 Related, yet somewhat
orthogonal to this literature is the paper by Neeman and Vulkan (2003) that
studies the conditions under which centralized markets, whose microstructure
is not modelled, drive out trade based on bilateral negotiations.
Another strand of literature to which my paper relates is the recent literature
on two-sided markets and platform competition (see, e.g., Caillaud and Jullien,
2001, 2003; Rochet and Tirole, 2002, 2004). A platform like a matchmaker for
men and women, is said to be two-sided because the agents on one side of the
platform (say, men) care about the number and nature of agents on the other
side (in this case, women), giving rise to coordination problems and multiple
equilibria. Interestingly, the two-sided nature in this paper does not pertain
to the intermediated markets, but to the search markets. This is so because
I adhere to the definition of the SEC by assuming that market makers are
committed (”stand ready”) to buy at the bid prices they quote. Consequently,
sellers are not concerned about the number of buyers attracted by a market
maker, whereas those sellers who consider participating in a search market
certainly care about the number of buyers participating in the search market.
Nonetheless, I also show that the analysis extends easily to platforms insofar
as every equilibrium in the game with market makers is also an equilibrium in
an appropriately defined game with platforms or matchmakers.
The industrial organization literature offers two interpretations for horizon-
tal differentiation, both of which are relevant for the present paper. According
to the first, firms (or products) are geographically differentiated. For example,
consider a job market intermediary. Clearly, workers in a given city will, all else
equal, prefer the intermediary who has job offers that come from that city. Sim-
ilarly, a firm that seeks to employ someone via an intermediary may prefer the
intermediary whose workers come from the same region to those who commute
a longer distance since these workers will be more flexible and eventually better
the terminology of Rust and Hall (2003), Spulber’s model is therefore a model of middlemen
rather than market makers.
6The paper by Ju et al. is primarily an empirical investigation of the effect of the collapse
of a market maker (Enron) on price dispersion in a search market. My paper is purely
theoretical and deals with the mixed strategies Ju et al. do no consider. Similarly, Kremer and
Polkovnichenko (2000) analyze price competition between capacity constrained intermediaries
who trade a homogenous good. In their setting, though, demand and supply intermediaries
face are independent in the following way: The equilibrium price intermediaries get on the
output market depends only on their sales capacity or stock, but not on the quantity they
buy. Consequently, their ask and bid windows are basically independent operations.
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motivated due to the shorter commute. According to the second interpretation,
the differentiation is in a characteristics space. Consumers and producers can,
e.g., choose between trading with a retailer specialized in organic food and an-
other one specialized in genetically manipulated food. In all likelihood, some
consumers and producers will prefer trading with the former, while others will
prefer buying from or selling to the latter.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I develop
the basic model. In section 3, I analyze the model when there are two mar-
ket makers but no search markets. Search markets are introduced in section
4, where I first derive equilibrium when there are no market makers and then
derive equilibrium when both market makers and search markets are active. In
section 5, I analyze asymmetric market structures and show in particular that
there is a complementarity between intermediaries’ profits. Section 6 shows that
every equilibrium in the game with a market makers is also an equilibrium in
a corresponding game when the intermediaries are platforms or matchmakers.
Section 7 concludes. The Appendix contains a somewhat cumbersome deriva-
tion, a longer proof and two generalizations. The first generalization extends
the model to parameter ranges that are excluded from the main part of the
paper. The second one analyzes the model when search markets are not fully
efficient.
2 The Model
The following is a natural adaptation of the models of Hotelling (1929) and
Salop (1979) to market making intermediaries. I assume that there is a con-
tinuum of buyers and a continuum of sellers, each with measure 12 . Buyers
and sellers are uniformly distributed along the North and South semi-circles of
a circle with circumference 1, respectively. Each buyer has a gross valuation
for the good v, and he either buys one unit of the good or none. Each seller
has production costs of zero, and he either produces one unit or none. Both
sellers and buyers bear a constant cost t > 0 per unit of distance they have to
travel with the good. I assume that v is so large in comparison to t that in any
equilibrium all buyers consume, i.e., I assume
v
t
>
3
2
.
This condition guarantees that competition between intermediaries will be so
tough that equilibrium profits of the intermediaries are independent of v. It is
the same as the condition that guarantees full market coverage in equilibrium
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in the standard Hotelling model.7 Because of this assumption, no buyers and
sellers will be inactive in equilibrium, which contrasts with the models of Gehrig
(1993) and Rust and Hall (2003).
There are two market places, one located at the Westernmost point of the
circle and the other one at the Easternmost, as illustrated in Figure 1. The
former is labelled W and the latter E. As an accounting convenience, I let the
locations of buyers and sellers increase from 0 to 12 from West to East. That is,
the buyer and seller with location 0 is situated in W , and the buyer and seller
with location 14 are at the North and South pole of the circle. Accordingly,
the location of the buyer and seller in E is 12 . Each market place can host a
market making intermediary or a search market or both. An intermediary in k
with k = E, W sets a pair of ask and bid prices (ak, bk) at which it is willing to
sell and buy. An intermediary is obliged to buy any quantity supplied at the
bid price it sets.8 The quantity it sells is the minimum of the quantity buyers
demand at its ask price and the quantity supplied.
Motivation and Discussion The assumption that search markets and mar-
ket makers occupy the same locations maintains a property of models with
homogenous market makers. Under this assumption, the buyers and sellers
who have the most to gain from search market participation (i.e., the high val-
uation buyers and the low cost sellers) also have the most to gain from trading
with intermediaries.9 Modelling the economy in the present manner amounts to
locating all buyers and sellers on separate Hotelling lines, and connecting these
at two points. It is straightforward for two market makers (and two search
markets), but imposes an odd asymmetry for three and more market makers.
Alternatively, one could allocate buyers and sellers uniformly along the full cir-
cle and assume additionally that they can exchange the good only at ”official”
markets, i.e., at search or intermediated markets. If search markets were lo-
cated at places different from intermediated markets, some buyers and sellers
would be closer to search markets and others would be closer to intermediated
markets. Allocating buyers and sellers along the full circle and requiring search
7The cases with v
t
< 3
2
are treated in Appendix A.
8On the other hand, an intermediary is not obliged to serve all buyers. If quantity de-
manded exceeds its stock, some buyers will be rationed.
9See Gehrig (1993), Fingleton (1997) and Rust and Hall (2003). This contrasts with
Yavas (1994), where low valuation buyers and high cost sellers join the intermediary. In
Yavas’ model, an intermediary does not set ask and bid prices but charges a percentage
of the surplus generated by a match, which enables the intermediary to price discriminate.
Consequently, those buyers and sellers who expect to generate a high surplus gain less by
joining the intermediary.
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Figure 1: Buyers and sellers uniformly distributed along a circle.
and intermediated markets to be at the same locations (and to be located sym-
metrically along the circle) would allow to study the entry and exit decisions of
market makers. Though this is certainly an interesting line of research, I leave
it for future work.
The present specification also maintains the linearity of the demand and
supply functions intermediaries face in equilibrium. It is most appropriate
when the horizontal differentiation is geographical. For example, suppose that
E and W are two cities, each of which has its own regional newspaper, and
consider intermediaries in labor markets. A firm that seeks an employee can
either place an ad in one of the newspapers, whereby it participates in the
search market in this city. Alternatively, it can contact an intermediary in this
city. Consequently, search markets and intermediated markets have the same
locations.
I first describe the model without search markets, where each market place
is host to one intermediary. The details of the organization of the search market
will be outlined when the interactions of search and intermediated markets are
analyzed.
3 Equilibrium without Search Markets
In this section, I first derive the equilibrium when there are no search markets
and when buyers and sellers care equally about the degree of horizontal differ-
entiation (i.e., have the same t > 0). Second, I look at the case where only
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agents on one side (sellers or buyers) care about horizontal differentiation.
3.1 Equilibrium Analysis
Let x̃ be the location of the buyer who at ask prices aW and aE is indifferent
between buying from the intermediary in W and the intermediary in E.10 De-
note by UWc (x) and U
E
c (x) the net utility of a buyer (or consumer) located at x
when buying from the intermediary in the West and East, respectively. Then,
buyer x̃ is indifferent between the two intermediaries if and only if
UWc (x̃) = v − tx̃− aW = v − t
(
1
2
− x̃
)
− aE = UEc (x̃)
⇔
x̃(aW , aE) =
1
4
+
aE − aW
2t
, (1)
where x̃(aW , aE) is the demand the intermediary in W faces. Analogously,
the demand the intermediary in E faces consists of the remaining buyers, i.e.,
1
2 − x̃(aW , aE).
Similarly, let UWp (y) and U
E
p (y) be the utility of a seller (or producer) at
location y when selling to the intermediary in W and E, respectively. Given
bid prices bW and bE , the seller with location ỹ is indifferent between selling to
the intermediary in W and the one in E when
UW (ỹ) = bW − tỹ = bE − t
(
1
2
− ỹ
)
= UE(ỹ)
⇔
ỹ(bW , bE) =
1
4
+
bW − bE
2t
. (2)
That is, ỹ(bW , bE) is the quantity supplied to the intermediary in W and 12 −
ỹ(bW , bE) is the quantity supplied to the one in E.
I assume that intermediation is costless. Then, the profit of the intermediary
in W is given by
ΠW (aW , bW ; aE , bE) = aW min
{
x̃(aW , aE), ỹ(bW , bE)
}− bW ỹ(bW , bE), (3)
because the quantity sold is the minimum of quantity demanded x̃ and quantity
suppliers sell ỹ. The objective of the intermediary is to maximize ΠW over aW
and bW . Clearly, it cannot be in the interest of an intermediary to buy more
10I assume that in case a buyer is rationed by an intermediary he can join the other in-
termediary at no cost in excess of the cost he would have incurred had he joined the other
intermediary at the outset. This amounts to assuming that the travel cost are incurred only
if the good is actually bought.
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than it sells. Therefore, x̃ = ỹ ≡ qW will hold, where qW denotes the quantity
traded by the intermediary in W .11
Replacing x̃ and ỹ by qW in equations (1) and (2) and solving for aW and
bW yields the inverse demand and supply functions the intermediary in W faces.
These are functions of its quantity traded and the prices set by the intermediary
in E. These functions are given, respectively, by
AW (qW , aE) = aE +
t
2
− 2tqW (4)
and
BW (qW , bE) = bE − t
2
+ 2tqW . (5)
The profit of the intermediary in W can now be written as a function of the
quantity qW it trades, i.e.,
ΠW (qW , aE , bE) =
(
AW (qW , aE)−BW (qW , bE)) qW = (aE − bE + t− 4tqW ) qW .
(6)
Maximizing (3) over (aW , bW ) subject to x̃ = ỹ is thus equivalent to maximizing
(6) over qW , which yields as a first order condition
0 = aE − bE + t− 8tqW . (7)
Notice that qW only depends on the spread (aE − bE) set by the competitor in
E.
Everything being symmetric, the optimal quantity traded by the interme-
diary in E, denoted as qE , given prices aW and bW will be given as
0 = aW − bW + t− 8tqE , (8)
which in turn only depends on the spread (aW − bW ) set by the intermediary
in W .
Equilibrium requires
ak = Ak(qk, a−k)
and
bk = Bk(qk, b−k)
11Assume the intermediary in W chooses prices such that x̃ > ỹ (which implies 1
2
−x̃ < 1
2
−ỹ
so that buyers will be served with certainty in E), and denote by α ∈ [0, 1] the probability
that a buyer is served by the intermediary in W . Then, because of the assumption that a
rationed buyer can still join the other intermediary buyer, x′ is indifferent between going to the
intermediary in W and in E if and only if α(v−tx′−aW )+(1−α)(v−t ( 1
2
− x′) = v−t ( 1
2
− x′).
Solving for x′ reveals that x′ = x̃. Thus, the number of buyers joining the intermediary in W
is not affected by rationing some buyers. On the other hand, ỹ > x̃ is not profitable because
buying excess stock is costly. Hence, it follows that inducing rationing is not profitable for an
intermediary.
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for k = E, W , where −k means not k. Taken together, the equilibrium condi-
tions for the intermediary in W read
0 = aE − bE + t− 8tqW (9)
aW = aE +
t
2
− 2tqW (10)
bW = bE − t
2
+ 2tqW . (11)
Subtracting (11) from (10) yields
aW − bW = aE − bE + t− 4tqW . (12)
By symmetry, aW − bW = aE − bE will hold in any equilibrium, so that
qW∗ =
1
4
follows from (12). Plugging qW = 14 into equation (9) reveals then that the
equilibrium spread z∗ ≡ aW − bW = aE − bE is given as
z∗ = t.
Notice that this spread is the same as the mark-up in the standard Bertrand
model of product differentiation.
By completely symmetric reasoning,
qE∗ =
1
4
can be established.
Notice that though the equilibrium spread is determined, equilibrium prices
are not. When the intermediary in W sets a high bid price b and a high ask
price a, then it is also optimal for the intermediary in E to set high prices. On
the other hand, if the opponent sets low prices, then it is best to set low prices
as well. Therefore, there will be a multiplicity of equilibria, some of which are
better for buyers, and others that are better for sellers.
Of course, there are some boundary conditions equilibrium prices have to
satisfy, which are that buyers and sellers get nonnegative utility when buying
from or selling to an intermediary. The seller who has to travel the largest
distance is located 14 away from the intermediary to whom he sells. Thus, he
incurs a travel cost of 14 t. Consequently, his net utility is nonnegative if and
only if
b− 1
4
t ≥ 0.
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Figure 2: The Set of Equilibrium Ask and Bid Prices.
Since the equilibrium spread is t, a lower bound for equilibrium prices is a = 54 t
and b = 14 t. On the other hand, for the buyer with the largest travel cost to get
a nonnegative utility, the equilibrium ask price a must be such that
v − 1
4
t− a ≥ 0.
Thus, equilibrium ask prices must be weakly smaller than v − 14 t, so that the
upper bounds for equilibrium prices is a = v − 14 t and b = v − 54 t. Moreover,
the highest ask and bid prices must be at least as large as the lowest ones, i.e.,
v − 14 t ≥ 54 t and v − 54 t ≥ 14 t must hold. Since
v >
3
2
t
is assumed, this requirement is met. In summary, therefore, all ask and bid
prices
a∗ ∈
[
5
4
t, v − 1
4
t
]
and b∗ ∈
[
1
4
t, v − 5
4
t
]
(13)
with a∗ = b∗ + t are consistent with equilibrium. The set of equilibria is illus-
trated in Figure 2, and the results I have just derived are summarized in the
following proposition.
Proposition 1 There is a continuum of equilibria in the market maker game
without search markets. In every equilibrium,
• both intermediaries set the same ask price (i.e., aW = aE) and the same
bid price (bW = bE)
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• buyers and sellers with x ≤ 14 and y ≤ 14 join the intermediary in W and
the other ones join the intermediary in E
• and the spread is
z∗ ≡ a∗ − b∗ = t,
where a∗ and b∗ are given by (13). Each market maker nets a profit of
Π∗ =
1
4
t.
The multiplicity of equilibria has perhaps some interesting implications. First,
all equilibria are socially efficient, but they differ with respect to distributional
aspects. Second, the multiplicity suggests that high price and high wage coun-
tries like, e.g., Switzerland and low price and low wage countries like, say, Spain
may represent the play of different equilibria.
3.2 Differentiation on One Side Only
In some instances, it is plausible to argue that the horizontal differentiation
pertains to only one side of the intermediation business. For example, geo-
graphical location may be more important for workers than for firms because
the workers travel to the firm. So as to account for this possibility and keeping
the worker-firm example in mind, I assume now that buyers (firms) are indiffer-
ent between sellers (workers), so that each buyer gets a net utility v > 0 from
getting the good from a seller. Sellers are still uniformly distributed along a
line of length 12 and bear the unit cost of transportation t > 0. Market makers
are still located at the East and West end of this line.
As before, I assume that in case a buyer does not get served by one interme-
diary he can try to get the good from the other intermediary at no additional
cost. Note also that because of the homogeneity of buyers, the rationing rule
does not matter. Consequently, the market where competition between the two
intermediaries will matter is the input market. To see this, note that though
an intermediary that sets a slightly lower ask price than its competitor would
attract all demand, it cannot satisfy this demand unless it has also attracted all
sellers. Since sellers only care about the price they get (net of transportation)
and disregard the number of buyers attracted by an intermediary, the essen-
tial market is the input market. This gives immediately way to the following
lemma.
Lemma 1 In any equilibrium in which both intermediaries attract some sellers,
aW = aE = v holds.
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Proof : Setting ask prices greater than v would yield zero sales, which is clearly
worse than selling something at a positive price. So, once I have shown that
each intermediary can sell all it buys from sellers when setting a = v, no matter
what ask price the other intermediary sets, the lemma will be proved. Note
that aggregate demand at an ask price a ≤ v is 12 , which is weakly more than
the aggregate quantity intermediaries can buy. Let q < 12 (where q <
1
2 must
hold because the lemma only applies to equilibria where both intermediaries
attract some sellers) be the number of sellers selling to intermediary −k and
assume −k sets an ask price a−k ≤ v. Residual demand for intermediary k
when setting ak = v is then 12 − q, which is weakly more than the number of
sellers attracted by k. Thus, given that −k sets an ask price weakly smaller
than v, setting a = v is the best response of k. Hence, the lemma is proved.¥
Let ỹ = 14 +
bW−bE
2t be the seller indifferent between intermediary E and W .
Taking Lemma 1 into account, intermediary W ’s profit as a function of bW and
bE is
ΠW (bW , bE) = (v − bW )ỹ(bW , bE) = (v − bW )
(
1
4
+
bW − bE
2t
)
.
Maximizing ΠW (bW , bE) with respect to bW yields the reaction function
bW∗(bE) =
v
2
− 1
4
t +
bE
2
.
In equilibrium, bE∗ = bW∗ = b∗ holds, whence
b∗ = v − 1
2
t.
Because b∗ = v− 12 t is the unique point of intersection of bW∗(bE) with the 45-
degree line, the equilibrium is unique. Notice that the equilibrium bid price is
larger than the highest equilibrium bid price when both sides are heterogenous,
which is a reflection of the fact that competition for the essential input good is
most intense.
The implied equilibrium spread is v − b∗ = 12 t, which is smaller than t,
the equilibrium spread when both sellers and buyers care about differentiation.
Consequently, equilibrium profit is
Π∗ =
1
8
t,
which is half the profit when both sides are heterogenous. Note that for the
seller at 14 to get nonnegative utility, b
∗ − 14 t = v − 12 t − 14 t > 0 must hold,
requiring
v >
3
4
t,
which holds if v/t is sufficiently large. Thus, I have shown:
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Proposition 2 In the unique equilibrium of the game where all sellers and no
buyers care about product differentiation, both market makers set
a∗ = v and b∗ = v − t
2
and net a profit of
Π∗ =
t
8
.
Homogenous Sellers, Heterogenous Buyers So as to complete the anal-
ysis of one-sided differentiation, I now consider the case where buyers but not
sellers are differentiated. Specifically, I assume that each seller has a cost of zero
and that buyers are distributed uniformly on [0, 12 ]. In case both intermediaries
set the same bid price b ≥ 0, each gets 14 , while if their bid prices differ, the
intermediary with the larger bid price gets the whole supply of 12 . I assume
that vt > 1, which makes sure that an intermediary who happens to buy all
the supply wants to sell all that it has bought.12 Note that the present model
can be seen as a model of price competition with differentiated products and
capacity constraints, where each intermediary’s capacity constraint is 14 if both
are active (i.e., if both have attracted some sellers). Because an intermediary
need, in general, not set a market clearing price, some buyers may be rationed.
Therefore, so as to complete the model, a rationing rule must be specified. The
two rationing schemes most frequently used in the literature are the so called
proportional (or random) rationing rule and the efficient rationing rule. Under
efficient rationing, if the intermediary in W attracts y sellers and x buyers with
y < x, then the buyers with locations in [0, y] get served by W and those in
(y, x] get rationed. Under proportional rationing, each buyer in [0, x] is served
with probability α ≡ yx and rationed with probability 1− α.
Equilibrium Ask Prices Independent of the rationing rule, both inter-
mediaries set a = v − 14 t in equilibrium if both have a capacity of 14 (i.e., if
both set the same bid price). The result is fairly trivial for efficient rationing
because then no buyer who is further away from an intermediary than 14 will
ever get served by that intermediary. Consequently, an intermediary cannot
gain anything by setting a < v − 14 t. On the other hand, prices a > v − 14 t
will not be optimal either. The reason for that is that demand is price elastic
for all q ≤ 12 . Thus, an intermediary would rather sell more than 14 at a lower
12More precisely, it makes sure that for any admissible number of sellers an intermediary
attracts, it will be in its interest to sell everything. A monopoly who sells quantity q earns a
revenue of R(q) = (v − tq)q, provided q ≤ 1
2
. Maximizing R(q) via q yields q∗ = v
2t
, which
is greater than 1
2
for v
t
> 1. Thus, under the assumption v
t
> 1 the maximal revenue of an
intermediary who has bought the whole supply of 1
2
is R∗ = (v − 1
2
t) 1
2
= v
2
− 1
4
t.
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price than selling less at a higher price. Therefore, the equilibrium ask price
will be a = v− 14 t for efficient rationing. With proportional rationing, the argu-
ment needed to establish that the unique optimal ask price for equal capacity
is a = v − 14 t is slightly more involved and is therefore relegated to Appendix
B.
Equilibrium Bid Prices The analysis for the input market in this model
is somewhat different from the previous models because bidding for inputs is
now homogenous Bertrand competition. Quite clearly, in equilibrium neither
intermediary must have an incentive to slightly overbid the competitor’s bid
price b. Since both intermediaries attract 14 sellers when setting the same bid
price, both will set ask prices equal to v − 14 t when setting the same bid price
b ≥ 0. Each intermediary’s expenditure will be b4 . On the other hand, when
slightly overbidding the bid b, an intermediary attracts 12 sellers. In this case,
its expenditure is approximately b2 , while the revenue will be
v
2 − 14 t (see the
footnote above). Consequently, an equilibrium condition is
(
v − 1
4
t− b
)
1
4
≥ v
2
− 1
4
t− b
2
. (14)
Solving (14) for b yields
b ≥ v − 3
4
t.
Clearly, if both intermediaries set b = v − 34 t and a = v − 14 t, this is an equilib-
rium, and each intermediary’s equilibrium profit is
Π∗ =
(
v − 1
4
t−
(
v − 3
4
t
))
1
4
=
1
8
t.
However, note that any larger bid prices will not affect revenue of an interme-
diary, whether it is the only seller or not. Consequently, any larger bid price
will not be overbid either. Therefore, provided the bid price allows nonnegative
profits, any larger bid price will be consistent with equilibrium. As ask prices
will be v − 14 t if both set the same input price, any bid price
b ≤ v − 1
4
t (15)
will therefore also be consistent with equilibrium. Thus, there is, again, a
continuum of equilibria, where any bid price
b ∈
[
v − 3
4
t, v − 1
4
t
]
is associated with an equilibrium. Note, though, that in contrast to the model
where differentiation is two-sided, intermediaries are not indifferent between
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these equilibria but unambiguously prefer the equilibria with lower bid prices
to those with higher bids. Moreover, the zero-profit equilibrium with b = v− 14 t
is quite risky insofar as an intermediary who sets this price makes a loss if the
other one deviates and sets a lower price. This risk is not small since as no
intermediary makes a profit in this equilibrium, either one may just as well
deviate and set a lower price, in which case it still makes zero profits. Note also
that this risk exists for every b > v − 12 t, though the incentives to deviate are
much smaller, given that each intermediary can make positive profits if both
set b ∈ [v − 12 t, v − 14 t).
Discussion Though profits are still positive when one side is homogenous
and the other one is heterogenous, equilibrium spreads and profits are unam-
biguously smaller with homogenous sellers or buyers.13 Nonetheless, the result
that both intermediaries can make positive profits when only sellers or buyers
are differentiated shows that the zero-profit outcome obtained by Stahl (1988)
depends, among other things, quite critically on the homogenous goods as-
sumption. If both sides or if only agents on one side are heterogenous, then
intermediaries make positive profits in (almost every) equilibrium.
It is also noteworthy that the result does not hinge on the assumption that
intermediaries do not sell forward contracts. To see this, assume that they
do so and that the default penalty is severe enough to deter default. Buy-
ers are homogenous, while sellers face transportation cost t > 0. In case of
price tie(s), the market(s) are shared evenly. It is easy to see that the ask
price a will not be underbid by the forward contracting competitor whenever(
a− 14 t
)
1
4 ≥
(
a− 12 t
)
1
2 ⇔ a ≤ 34 t holds. Thus, when intermediaries sell for-
ward contracts, there is a symmetric equilibrium with a∗ = 34 t and b
∗ = 14 t,
implying an equilibrium profit of 18 t for each market maker, just like in the
model without forward contracts. Regardless of whether there are forward con-
tracts or not, the equilibrium thus involves positive profits as long as there is
differentiation on at least one side. This observation contrasts with, and com-
plements, Stahl (1988), who finds that the equilibrium profits of two forward
contracting intermediaries are zero when goods are homogenous.
13This observation is consistent with the experience of an anonymous job market intermedi-
ary (personnel communication) who says that their profits are smallest in those sectors where
the supply of labor is largest.
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4 Equilibrium with Search Markets
A number of papers have started to study market microstructures when sellers
and buyers have the additional option of meeting bilaterally.14 This motivates
to see how equilibrium behavior is affected if competing, horizontally differ-
entiated intermediaries face competition from search markets. This is what I
analyze in this section.
4.1 Assumptions
I now assume that there is a search market in W and one in E. As before,
buyers and sellers have a cost per unit of transportation t > 0. I assume that in
a given search market, buyers and sellers are uniformly randomly matched. If
there are, say, more buyers than sellers in a search market, sellers are matched
with probability one, while buyers are matched with a probability proportional
to the ratio of the number of sellers over the number of buyers. If matched,
a buyer and a seller share the gains from trade evenly. Again, transportation
costs are incurred only when trade occurs.
The assumptions underlying the organization of search markets are similar
to those of Gehrig (1993). A difference is that he assumes take-it-or-leave-it
offers, whereas here sellers and buyers share gains from trade evenly. Because
here there are two search markets whereas in his model there is but one, the
equilibrium outcome will be somewhat different in my model. Another differ-
ence to Gehrig’s model that has already been mentioned is that there are no
inactive buyers and sellers because all possible buyer-seller matches generate
positive surplus. It seems also possible to model the search market as a dy-
namic matching market à la Spulber (1996) and Rust and Hall (2003), where
buyers and sellers search for an opportunity to trade with middlemen. As in
the homogenous goods model I expect both models to yield very similar inverse
demand and supply functions facing intermediaries.
4.2 Equilibrium Without Market Makers
For this subsection, I assume that there are no market makers. Let vc and vc
be, respectively, the lowest and highest net valuations of consumers present in
a given search market. Similarly, I denote by vp and vp, respectively, the lowest
and highest net cost of producers present in a given search market. Notice that
14See Rubinstein and Wolinksy (1987), Gehrig (1993), Spulber (1996, 1999), Fingleton
(1997), Rust and Hall (2003), Ju et al. (2004), and Shevchenko (2004).
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the maximal distance a producer travels is no larger than 12 . Consequently,
vp ≤ 12 t
will hold. Similarly, no buyer will travel more than 12 . Thus, vc ≥ v − 12 t > t,
where the strict inequality follows from the assumption v > 32 t. Therefore,
vc > t > vp
will hold in any search market.15
Let V Wc (x) and V
E
c (x) denote the expected utility of a buyer at location x
when participating in the search market in W and E, respectively. Similarly,
let V Wp (y) and V
E
p (y) denote the expected utility of a seller at location y when
participating in the search market in W and E.
Lemma 2 (Single-crossing) In any equilibrium with search market participa-
tion in both cities, the following holds: If V Wc (x
′) R V Ec (x′) for some x′, then
V Wc (x) ≷ V Ec (x) for all x ≶ x′. Analogously, if V Wp (y′) R V Ep (y′) for some y′,
then V Wp (y) ≷ V Ep (y) for all y ≶ y′.
Proof : Let F kp (y) be the non-degenerate equilibrium distribution of sellers in
the search market in k, k = E, W , and let γkc ≤ 1 be the probability that a
buyer is matched in market k. Then,
V Wc (x
′) =
γWc
2
∫ 1
2
0
[v − tx′ − ty]dFWp (y) (16)
and
V Ec (x
′) =
γEc
2
∫ 1
2
0
[
v − t
(
1
2
− x′
)
− t
(
1
2
− y
)]
dFEp (y). (17)
Note that because of the assumption that there is a continuum of buyers,
whether a particular buyer joins market k has no effect on γkc . Therefore,
∂V Wc (x
′)
∂x′ < 0 and
∂V Ec (x
′)
∂x′ > 0 follows for any non-degenerate distributions F
W
p
and FEp . Consequently, if V
W
c (x
′) ≥ V Ec (x′) holds, then V Wc (x) > V Ec (x) holds
for x < x′, and similarly, if V Wc (x′) ≤ V Ec (x′) holds, then V Wc (x) < V Ec (x)
holds for x > x′. The proof for sellers is completely symmetric and is therefore
omitted. ¥
The result reported in Lemma 2 has first been stated by Gehrig (1993). The
result implies that the sets of buyers and sellers joining a search market will
be convex sets and will include the buyer with the highest net valuation and
15Using the terminology of Spulber (2005), all possible matches are viable for v
t
> 1.
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the lowest cost seller. That is, buyer and seller with location 0 will join the
search market in W and the buyer and seller at 12 will join the search market in
E. Moreover, because all buyers and all sellers in these sets will join the same
search market, the distribution of buyers and sellers active in a search market
will be uniform.
Let vc be the net valuation of a buyer joining a search market, where the
highest and lowest cost sellers have costs vp and vp and where the probability
of a match for a buyer is γc. Then, the expected utility of the buyer vc is16
Vc(vc) =
γc
2
∫ vp
vp
(vc − vp) 1
vp − vp
dvp, (18)
where 1vp−vp is the density for the uniform distribution from which sellers’ costs
are drawn. Integrating out and simplifying yields
Vc(vc) =
γc
2
[
vc − 12(vp + vp)
]
. (19)
This formula has a neat interpretation. Consider the second term inside the
bracket, 12(vp+vp). This is the expected cost of the producer to whom the buyer
will be matched. Consequently, the difference between vc and the expected cost
is the aggregate surplus buyer vc expects to generate. If matched, the buyer
just gets one half of this surplus because of the even sharing assumption, which
explains the fraction 12 that pre-multiplies the bracket.
Similarly, consider a seller with cost vp who joins a search market where the
highest and lowest valuations of buyers are vc and vc and where the probability
of being matched is γp. Then,
Vp(vp) =
γp
2
∫ vc
vc
(vc − vp) 1
vc − vc
dvc =
γp
2
[
1
2
(vc + vc)− vp
]
, (20)
where the second equality follows after integrating and simplifying.
Stable Equilibria Clearly, not joining a given search market if no one else
joins it is a best response for every buyer and seller. Therefore, it is always
an equilibrium that one or both search markets are inactive. However, these
equilibria are easily seen to be unstable: If an arbitrarily small number of agents
(a set of agents with positive measure) were to deviate and to join a hitherto
16I make a slight abuse of notation by using Vi(.), i = c, p to denote both the expected
utility from search market participation as a function of the net valuation (e.g., vc) and as
a function of the location (e.g., x). Though the two things are clearly connected, e.g. for a
buyer at x who joins the search market in W vc ≡ v − tx, the two functions are not exactly
the same.
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inactive search market, then it would be a best response for many other agents
to join this search market, too. On the other hand, equilibria where both
search markets are open are stable. Even if a small number of agents deviates
and becomes either inactive or joins the other search market, it will still be
optimal for the other agents who in equilibrium join this search market to stay
in this search market. Therefore, equilibria where one or both search markets
are inactive are unstable, whereas equilibria where both search markets are
open are stable.
I now turn to a characterization of all equilibria.
Lemma 3 There is no equilibrium where both search markets are balanced,
(i.e., attract the same number of buyers and sellers) but where one is larger
than the other one.
Proof : Notice first that Lemma 2 implies that in any stable equilibrium,
the buyer and seller at 0 will join the search market in W and the buyer and
seller at 12 will join the one in E. Therefore, v
k
p = 0 and v
k
c = v for k = E,W .
Next, assume without loss that the larger search market is in W . Let q ≥ 14
be the number of buyers joining W in equilibrium. Since by hypothesis search
markets are balanced, q is also the number of sellers joining W , and all buyers
and sellers will be matched in either market. Then, the buyer at location q
must get at least the level of utility from the search market in W as from the
one in E. That is,
V Wc (q) =
1
2
[
v − tq − 1
2
tq
]
≥ 1
2
[
v − t
(
1
2
− q
)
− 1
2
t
(
1
2
− q
)]
= V Ec (q),
where tq = vWp and t
(
1
2 − q
)
= vEp . Solving for q yields q ≤ 14 , implying
together with the assumption q ≥ 14 that q = 14 . Thus, both markets must be
of equal size. ¥
I now show first that there are no equilibria with unbalanced search markets,
and second that in the unique (stable) equilibrium, buyers and sellers with x ≤ 14
and y ≤ 14 join the market in W and all other buyers and sellers join the market
in E.
Lemma 4 There are no equilibria with unbalanced search markets.
Proof : Without loss, assume x̃ < ỹ, so that buyers are rationed in market
E and sellers in market W , and assume that this is an equilibrium. When
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joining the search market in W , buyer x̃ gets utility
V Wc (x̃) =
1
2
[
v − tx̃− 1
2
tỹ
]
,
while when joining the market in E he gets
V Ec (x̃) =
γEc
2
[
v − t
(
1
2
− x̃
)
− 1
2
t
(
1
2
− ỹ
)]
.
Since γEc < 1, V
E
c (x̃) <
1
2
[
v − t (12 − x̃
)− 12 t
(
1
2 − ỹ
)]
holds. In equilibrium, x̃
must be indifferent between the two markets, so
1
2
[
v − tx̃− 1
2
tỹ
]
<
1
2
[
v − t
(
1
2
− x̃
)
− 1
2
t
(
1
2
− ỹ
)]
must hold. Re-arranging and simplifying yields
x̃ >
3
8
− 1
2
ỹ. (21)
On the other hand, the seller at ỹ gets utility
V Wp (ỹ) =
γWp
2
[
v − 1
2
tx̃− tỹ
]
when joining the search market in W and utility
V Ep (ỹ) =
1
2
[
v − 1
2
t
(
1
2
− x̃
)
− t
(
1
2
− ỹ
)]
when going to E. Since γWp < 1, V
W
p (ỹ) <
1
2
[
v − 12 tx̃− tỹ
]
holds. In equilib-
rium, ỹ must be indifferent between the two markets. A necessary condition
for this is
1
2
[
v − 1
2
tx̃− tỹ
]
>
1
2
[
v − 1
2
t
(
1
2
− x̃
)
− t
(
1
2
− ỹ
)]
.
Re-arranging and simplifying yields
3
4
− 2ỹ > x̃. (22)
Taken together, the equilibrium conditions are thus
3
4
− 2ỹ > x̃ > 3
8
− 1
2
ỹ (23)
and by assumption
ỹ > x̃. (24)
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The final step is to show that conditions (23), (24), and x̃ 6= 14 are not compat-
ible. To see this, assume first x̃ < 14 . The second inequality in (23) can then be
satisfied only if ỹ > 14 . However, the conditions in (23) require also
3
4
− 2ỹ > 3
8
− 1
2
ỹ
⇔
ỹ <
1
4
,
which is the desired contradiction. On the other hand, if x̃ > 14 , the first
inequality in (23) requires ỹ < 14 , which contradicts (24). Hence, there is no
equilibrium with unbalanced search markets. ¥
Proposition 3 In the unique stable equilibrium, all buyers and sellers with
locations x, y ≤ 14 join the market in W , and all buyers and sellers with x, y > 14
join the market in E.
Proof : Consider the constraints in the previous lemma and replace all strict
inequalities with weak inequalities. The only case when all constraints are
satisfied is when x̃ = ỹ = 14 .¥
4.3 Equilibrium with Market Makers
I now analyze equilibrium when there are market makers. To see the potential
for market making, observe from equation (19) that the expected utility of
search market participation for a buyer with net valuation vc is less than 12vc
with vp > 0. Thus, there is a positive ask price a such that this buyer would be
indifferent between buying at this price and joining the search market. That
is, there exists an ask price a such that
vc − a = Vc(vc). (25)
In other words, for every buyer vc there is a reservation price a(vc) ≡ vv−Vc(vc)
such that he is indifferent between buying from the intermediary at the ask price
a = a(vc) and joining the search market. Substituting the expression for Vc(vc)
given in equation (19) above yields
vc − a = 12
[
vc − 12(vp + vp)
]
.
Of particular interest is the reservation price of the buyer with the highest net
valuation active in the search market, i.e.,
a(vc) ≡ 12vc +
1
4
(vp + vp), (26)
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since this is the reservation price that is relevant for the market maker - if it
sets a = a(vc), all buyers with greater net valuations will prefer buying from
the market maker to search market participation, and all buyers with smaller
net valuations will prefer participating in the search market.17
Analogously, one can derive reservation prices b(vp) for sellers with net cost
vp such that seller vp is indifferent between participating in the search market
and selling to the intermediary, i.e.,
b(vp)− vp = Vp(vp). (27)
For reasons analogous to those for buyers, the bid price relevant for an interme-
diary will be the one that makes the most efficient seller in the search market,
vp, indifferent between participating in the search market and selling to the
intermediary, which is given by
b(vp) = vp + Vp(vp). (28)
Indifference Between Search Markets Before deriving the inverse de-
mand and supply function facing the intermediaries, the location of the buyer
and seller who are indifferent between the search market in W and E have to be
determined. The reason for that is that the expected utility of search market
participation of the buyer and seller at qW (who are indifferent between trading
with the intermediary in W and joining the search market in W ) depend on
the net cost and the net valuation of the seller and buyer who are indifferent
between the search markets, as can be seen from equations (19) and (20).
As a function of qW and qE , there will be a buyer x̃(qW , qE) who is indifferent
between the two search markets. Similarly, denote the location of the seller who
is indifferent between the two markets by ỹ(qW , qE). The derivation of these
indifferent agents is very similar to the model of market making without search
markets. The difference is that they are now not indifferent between trading
with the two intermediaries, but only between joining the two search markets.
Nonetheless, it is via these agents that the decisions of the market maker in W
and E have an impact on the other one’s payoff.
So, let the sellers at qW (and 12 − qE) and ỹ be the sellers in the search
markets in W (and E), respectively, with the lowest and highest cost. Then,
the expected utility of the buyer at x̃, who is indifferent between the two search
17To see this, differentiate both sides of (25) with respect to vc. The derivative of the left-
hand side is one, while the right-hand side increases by less as vc increases. Therefore, if for
a given a, ṽc − a = Vc(ṽc) holds for some ṽc, then vc − a ≷ Vc(vc) ⇔ vc ≷ ṽc, whence ṽc = vc
follows.
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markets and who has therefore the lowest net valuation in either of them, sat-
isfies
V Wc (x̃) =
1
2
[
v − tx̃− 1
2
(tqW + tỹ)
]
=
1
2
(v − tx̃)− 1
4
(tqW + tỹ) (29)
and
V Ec (x̃) =
1
2
[
v − t
(
1
2
− x̃
)]
− 1
4
[
tqE + t
(
1
2
− ỹ
)]
. (30)
Solving V Wc (x̃) = V
E
c (x̃) for x̃ yields
x̃ =
3
8
− 1
2
ỹ +
1
4
(
qE − qW ) . (31)
Analogously, the expected utilities from search in W and E for seller ỹ satisfy
V Wp (ỹ) =
1
2
[
1
2
(v − tqW + v − tx̃)− tỹ
]
=
1
2
(v − tỹ)− 1
4
(tqW + tx̃) (32)
and
V Ep (ỹ) =
1
2
[
v − t
(
1
2
− ỹ
)]
− 1
4
[
tqE + t
(
1
2
− x̃
)]
. (33)
Solving V Wp (x̃) = V
E
p (x̃) for ỹ yields
ỹ =
3
8
− 1
2
x̃ +
1
4
(
qE − qW ) . (34)
Finally, solving equations (31) and (34) for x̃ and ỹ yields
x̃(qW , qE) = ỹ(qW , qE) =
1
4
+
1
6
(qE − qW ). (35)
The following is noteworthy. As, say, qW increases, x̃(qW , qE) and ỹ(qW , qE)
decrease. Due to the increased trade by the intermediary in W , the highest net
valuation of a buyer in the search market in W decreases and the lowest cost of a
seller in the search market in W increases. As a consequence, the search market
in W becomes less attractive for buyers close to x̃, and thus, more buyers and
sellers want to join the search market in E. Observe that vEc decreases and v
E
p
increases as x̃ and ỹ increase. Consequently, from the perspective of the buyers
and sellers close to E (i.e., close to 12), search market participation becomes less
attractive. This has some interesting implications that will be discussed below.
Indifference Between Intermediated Trade and Search Market Hav-
ing determined the location of the buyer and seller who are indifferent between
search markets, I can now derive the expected utility from search market par-
ticipation for the buyer and seller who are indifferent between search market
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participation and trading with an intermediary. This will then allow me to
compute the reservation price of this buyer and seller for trading with the in-
termediary.
The expected utility of the buyer at qW from search market participation is
V Wc (q
W ) =
1
2
v − 1
16
t− 17
24
tqW − 1
24
tqE . (36)
As this buyer is indifferent between search market participation and buying
from the intermediary in W at ask price aW , whence he derives a surplus of
UWc (q
W ) = v − tqW − aW ,
it has to be true that
UWc (q
W ) = V Wc (q
W ). (37)
Solving equation (37) for aW yields the reservation price of the indifferent buyer
for buying from the intermediary in W , and thus the inverse demand function
this intermediary faces. Let AW (qW , qE) denote this solution. It is given by
AW (qW , qE) =
v
2
+
1
16
t +
1
24
tqE − 7
24
tqW . (38)
Analogously, the seller at qW expects utility
V Wp (q
W ) =
1
2
v − 1
16
t− 17
24
tqW − 1
24
tqE (39)
from participating in the search market in W . If he sells to the intermediary at
bid price bW , his surplus is
UWp (q
W ) = bW − tqW .
He is indifferent between search and selling to the market maker if and only if
UWp (q
W ) = V Wp (q
W ). (40)
Solving (40) for bW yields the reservation price of the seller at qW for selling to
the intermediary, and thus the inverse supply function facing the intermediary.
Denote this solution by BW (qW , qE). It is
BW (qW , qE) =
v
2
− 1
16
t− 1
24
tqE +
7
24
tqW . (41)
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Figure 3: Equilibrium with Search and Intermediated Markets.
Profit Maximization by Market Makers Given the inverse demand and
supply functions (38) and (41), the profit of the market maker in W is
ΠW (qW , qE) = ZW (qW , qE)qW , (42)
where
ZW (qW , qE) ≡ AW (qW , qE)−BW (qW , qE) = t
(
1
8
+
1
12
qE − 7
12
qW
)
(43)
is the spread function the intermediary in W faces.
As in the case without search markets, the profit of an intermediary is thus
independent of buyers’ gross utility v. Maximizing ΠW (qW , qE) over qW , taking
qE as given, yields
0 = t
(
1
8
+
1
12
qE − 14
12
qW
)
. (44)
Thus, the reaction function is
qW (qE) =
3
28
+
1
14
qE . (45)
By symmetry, qE = qW = q∗ will hold in equilibrium. Thus, equilibrium
quantity traded by an intermediary will be
q∗ =
3
26
. (46)
Inserting qE = qW = q∗ into the inverse demand and supply functions (38) and
(41) yields the equilibrium ask and bid prices
a∗ =
v
2
+
7
208
t and b∗ =
v
2
− 7
208
t, (47)
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so that the equilibrium spread is z∗ = t 7104 . Equilibrium profit is
Π∗ = t
21
2704
, (48)
which is approximately 0.0078t. Witness the substantial reduction of equilib-
rium profit compared to the case without search markets, when equilibrium
profit is 14 t, which is more than thirty times larger than 0.0078t.
Proposition 4 The model has a unique equilibrium with two market makers
and two active search markets. In this equilibrium, market makers set a∗ =
v
2 +
7
208 t and b
∗ = v2 − 7208 t. The buyers and sellers with locations x, y ∈
[
0, 326
]
trade with the intermediary in W , the buyers and sellers with x, y ∈ ( 326 , 14
]
join the search market in W , the buyers and sellers with x, y ∈ (14 , 1026
)
join the
search market in E and the buyers and sellers with x, y ∈ [1026 , 12
]
trade with the
intermediary in E.
Proof : The proof is in Appendix C.¥
Note that the claim of Proposition 4 is not that there is a unique equilibrium,
but that there is a unique equilibrium where the two search markets and the
two market makers are active. Nonetheless, the uniqueness of equilibrium in
the presence of search markets contrasts with the continuum of equilibria in
the model without search markets.18 Observe also from (45) that the best
response quantity of the intermediary in W is upward-sloping in qE , implying
that quantities traded are strategic complements. Were the two intermediaries
able to collude, they would choose qW and qE to maximize
ΠW + ΠE = t
(
1
8
+
1
12
qE − 7
12
qW
)
qW + t
(
1
8
+
1
12
qW − 7
12
qE
)
qE ,
yielding as collusive quantities q̃W = q̃E = 526 >
3
26 = q
∗.
Discussion Much like in the models of Gehrig (1993) and Rust and Hall
(2003), equilibrium is characterized by a partition of the sets of sellers and
buyers. High valuation buyers and low cost sellers trade with intermediaries,
and less efficient producers and lower valuation consumers participate in search
markets.19 In contrast to these models, this happens here in the presence of
competition between intermediaries, and these intermediaries net positive prof-
its in equilibrium. Moreover, the presence of search markets has an effect on
18This point is similar to Yavas (1995), who observes that in a model with endogenous search
intensities the presence of a broker can reduce the set of equilibria and may even induce a
unique equilibrium.
19Similar equilibrium behavior obtains in the model of Fingleton (1997).
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Figure 4: Equilibrium Supply and Demand Functions and Equilibrium Prices.
the equilibrium quantities traded by intermediaries in my model: An interme-
diary’s quantity traded decreases from 14 in the game without to
3
26 in the game
with search markets. This contrasts with the above mentioned models, where
the presence or absence of search markets only has an impact on the spread
functions the intermediaries face, but not on the quantities traded in equilib-
rium. To see this, note that the equilibrium spread a monopolistic intermediary
in the models of Gehrig (1993) and Rust and Hall (2003) faces can be written
as
Z(q) = ∆(1− 2q), (49)
where q is the quantity traded by the intermediary and ∆ ∈ [0, 2] is a parameter
measuring the effectiveness of the search market.20 It takes the value one if the
search market is shut down (or completely ineffective) and smaller values the
more efficient the search market. Assuming zero costs for market making, the
profit function is
Π(q) = ∆(1− 2q)q. (50)
It is easy to see that this function is maximized with
q∗ =
1
4
,
which obviously is independent of ∆. In other words, in these models the
equilibrium quantity traded (though, of course, not the equilibrium profit) is
20More precisely, ∆ = 2−λ
2
∈ [ 1
2
, 1] for the Gehrig model, where ∆ = 1
2
occurs if and only if
the search market is fully efficient, i.e., for λ = 1. In contrast, in the model of Rust and Hall,
∆ = 4δ
1+4δ
can take any value between zero and one, where δ ∈ (0,∞) is a discount factor that
is adjusted for the probability of exit. A similar representation can be obtained for the model
studied by Fingleton (1997). A derivation of the equilibrium spread function for these models
is available upon request.
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independent of whether there is a search market or not, or how efficient the
matching process is.
5 Asymmetric Market Structures
In this section, I briefly investigate asymmetric market structures. In part, this
is motivated by the observation of Ju et al. (2004) that in the aftermath of the
exit of Enron as a market maker in the North-American natural gas market,
price dispersion in the search market increased dramatically. They show also
that this increase in price dispersion is consistent with a model where market
makers are homogenous. So, it is interesting to see whether a similar prediction
obtains in a model where market makers are horizontally differentiated.
For that purpose, I assume now that the market maker in E exits, and I
derive the equilibrium for the situation when there are two search markets (one
in W and one in E) and a monopoly market maker in W . I then compare the
equilibrium with the one derived in the previous section.
When there is but one intermediary in W , but two search markets, buyers
and sellers that are close to the intermediary will trade with the intermediary,
while buyers and sellers who are a bit further away will trade with one another
in the search market in W , and buyers and sellers closest to E will trade in the
search market in E. As before, denote by x̃ and ỹ the locations of the buyer and
seller who are indifferent between joining either search market. For notational
ease, denote by q the quantity traded by the intermediary. In equilibrium,
x̃ = ỹ. These values will be functions of q and are derived as solution to
V Wc (x̃) =
1
2
[
v − tx̃− 1
2
t(q + x̃)
]
=
1
2
[
v − t
(
1
2
− x̃
)
− 1
2
t
(
1
2
− x̃ + 0
)]
= V Ec (x̃),
which is
x̃ =
1
4
− 1
6
q.
It is re-assuring that this is the same as the result when setting qE = 0 in (35).
Plugging in these values into the utility functions for the buyer and seller
at locations q yields
V Wc (q) =
1
2
v − 1
16
t− 17
24
tq
and
V Wp (q) =
1
2
v +
1
16
t +
17
24
tq.
Thus, the reservation prices for trade with the intermediary are
A(q) =
1
2
v +
1
16
t− 7
24
tq
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and
B(q) =
1
2
v − 1
16
t +
7
24
tq.
Consequently, the intermediary’s profit is
Π(q) = t
(
1
8
− 7
12
q
)
q,
yielding the monopoly quantity
qM∗ =
3
28
.
Again, it is re-assuring that this is the same value that is derived when setting
qE = 0 in the reaction function (45). It is noteworthy that qM∗ is smaller than
an individual market maker’s equilibrium quantity under duopoly, q∗ = 326 .
The equilibrium ask and bid prices of the monopoly are
aM∗ =
v
2
+
t
32
and bM∗ =
v
2
− t
32
.
Notice that aM∗ < a∗ and bM∗ > b∗. As both the spread the intermediary earns
and the quantity it trades are smaller under monopoly than under duopoly, its
equilibrium profit will also be smaller. This profit is
ΠM∗ = t
(
1
8
− 3
48
)
3
28
=
3
448
t,
which is less than Π∗ = 212704 t. Also note that x̃ =
13
56 <
1
4 .
So as to show that there is no profitable deviation for the monopolistic inter-
mediary, I first show that it is not profitable for the monopolistic intermediary
in W to extinguish only the search market in W while keeping the one in E
alive. The issue here is that if the quantity qW traded by the intermediary in W
is large enough, then no agent with location x̃ > qW will be indifferent between
the two search markets, but will rather prefer search market E to the search
market W . This is easiest to see by inspection of (35) when setting qE = 0.
For x̃ ≥ qW to hold,
1
4
− 1
6
qW ≥ qW ⇔ qW ≤ 3
14
.
For larger qW ’s, the agents at qW will be indifferent between joining the in-
termediary in W and the search market in E.21 Consequently, the reservation
21An alternative way to see this is as follows. Let q̃ be the location of the buyer and seller
who are the only agents in the search market in W and who would consequently be the agents
with the lowest valuation and the highest cost in the search market in E. Then, their utility
from the search market in W is
V Wc (q̃) =
v
2
− tq̃ = V Wp (q̃),
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prices for trading the quantity q̃ with the intermediary in W will be an aW and
bW such that
v − aW − tq̃ = V Ec (q̃)
and
bW − tq̃ = V Ep (q̃),
where V Ec (q̃) and V
E
c (q̃) are as defined in the previous footnote. Solving for a
W
and bW yields the inverse demand and supply functions
AW (q̃) =
v
2
+
3
8
t− 7
4
tq̃
and
BW (q̃) =
v
2
− 3
8
t +
7
4
tq̃,
so that the intermediary’s profit is
ΠW (q̃) =
3
4
t(3− 14q̃)q̃,
which is maximized at q̃∗ = 328 . However, this violates the restriction that q̃
must be larger than 314 for these inverse demand and supply functions to be
valid in the first place. Consequently, the optimal quantity will be as small as
necessary, i.e., will equal 314 . Inserting this value into the profit function reveals
immediately that the profit will be zero. Hence, this deviation does not pay.
Second, the intermediary may want to take over the whole market by extin-
guishing the search market in E, too. However, so as to attract the buyer and
seller at 12 , these agents must be offered an ask price below
v
2 and a bid price
above v2 , where
v
2 is the price at which they would trade in the search market in
E if only these two agents join the search market in E. Clearly, this deviation
entails a negative profit and is therefore not profitable. Thus, I have shown:
while their expected utility from participating in E is
V Ec (q̃) =
1
2
[
v − t
(
1
2
− q̃
)
− 1
2
t
(
0 +
1
2
− q̃
)]
=
v
2
− 3
8
t +
3
4
tq̃
and
V Ep (q̃) =
1
2
[
1
2
(
v + v − t
(
1
2
− q̃
))
− t
(
1
2
− q̃
)]
=
v
2
− 3
8
t +
3
4
tq̃,
where the fact has been used that the most efficient seller in E has cost equal to zero and the
highest valuation buyer a valuation of v. Notice that these utilities increase in q̃ because the
search market in E becomes more attractive the closer to 1
2
the marginal buyers and sellers
are. It is easy to see that
V Wc (q̃) ≥ V Ec (q̃) ⇔ q̃ ≤ 3
14
.
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Proposition 5 With active search markets, the quantity a market maker trades,
the spread it sets and the profit it earns are smaller in equilibrium under monopoly
than under duopoly.
Discussion It is well known that for some values of v and t, the standard
Hotelling model of horizontal differentiation in product markets exhibits the
feature that equilibrium prices rise as a second firm enters the market.22 The
reason for this counterintuitive effect is that the location of the marginal con-
sumer is closer to the firm under duopoly than under monopoly. Consequently,
the willingness to pay of this consumer is larger under duopoly than under
monopoly, which is why equilibrium prices increase as entry occurs. However,
though prices may increase with entry in the standard Hotelling model, prof-
its unambiguously decrease when a second firm enters.23 In the model where
market makers face competition from search markets, the mechanism at work
is very much the same. To see this, note that with qE = 0, x̃ < 14 for any
positive quantity traded by the intermediary in W , where x̃ corresponds to the
marginal consumer who is closer in the standard Hotelling model. The twist in
the present model is that the smaller x̃, the more attractive is search market
participation in W from the perspective of the marginal buyer and seller at
qW . That is, utility from search increases as x̃ decreases, as a consequence of
which the willingness to pay (and the reservation price to sell) for intermediated
trade decreases (increases). This contrasts with the equilibrium with two mar-
ket makers, where x̃ = 14 . Consequently, the buyer and seller at q
W will derive
less utility from search market participation when there are two intermediaries.
Thus, the buyer and the seller at qW will have a higher willingness to pay for
the intermediary and a lower reservation price to sell to the intermediary than
if there is no intermediary in E. Therefore, the profit of the intermediary in W
increases, as an intermediary enters in E.24
The Effect on Equilibrium Price Dispersion I only characterize the equi-
librium support of prices in the search markets, i.e., I do not pay attention to
the distribution of these prices. As a buyer with valuation vc and a seller with
costs vp share the aggregate surplus evenly, the price at which they trade is
given as p = vc+vp2 . Thus, the highest price, p, occurs when the seller with
22If the Hotelling line is of length 1, this happens for values of v
t
∈ [ 3
2
, 2
]
.
23See Chen and Riordan (2005) for a model where for some parameters, profits increase
when the number of firms increases.
24Notice that in contrast to the model of Chen and Riordan (2005) and the Hotelling
model, higher profits and higher ask prices (and lower bid prices) obtain for a very wide range
of parameters, i.e., at least for all v
t
> 3
2
.
5 ASYMMETRIC MARKET STRUCTURES 32
the highest cost vp is matched to the buyer with the greatest valuation vp.
Similarly, the lowest price, denoted as p, in the support occurs when the most
efficient seller vp active in a search market is matched to the buyer with the
lowest valuation vc.
When two market makers are active, each of them trades the quantity q = 326
and x̃ = ỹ = 14 . Thus, vp =
1
4 t and vc = v − 326 t, so that
p =
v
2
+
7
104
t.
As for the lowest price, vp =
3
26 t and vc = v − 14 t, so that
p =
v
2
− 7
104
t.
When there is but one market maker, the two search markets differ. Recall
that x̃ = 1356 . Therefore, v
E
c = v and v
E
p = t
15
56 . This implies
pE =
v
2
+
15
112
t.
The lowest price in E is given by
pE =
v
2
− 15
112
t,
since vEp = 0 and v
E
c = v − t1556 . In the search market in W , vWp = 1356 t,
vWc = v − 328 t, vWp = 328 t and vWc = v − 1356 t. Consequently,
pW =
v
2
+
7
112
t
and
pW =
v
2
− 7
112
t
follows. Thus,
pE < p < pW < pW < p < pE .
Thus, measured by the breadth of the support in both markets, equilibrium
price dispersion increases as a market maker exits. However, if one considers
only the market in W , price dispersion decreases.
Equilibrium with one intermediary and one search market Finally, I
look at the case where the intermediary in W faces competition from only one
search market that is located in W as well. Then,
Vc(q) =
1
2
[
v − tq − 1
2
(
tq +
1
2
t
)]
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and
Vp(q) =
1
2
[
1
2
(
v − tq + v − 1
2
t
)
− tq
]
,
yielding
A(q) =
1
2
v +
1
8
t− 1
4
tq
and
B(q) =
1
2
v − 1
8
t +
1
4
tq.
So, profit of the intermediary is
Π(q) =
1
4
t (1− 2q) q,
which is maximized at q∗ = 14 . Hence, the maximal profit of the intermediary
is Π∗ = 132 t.
So as to check the validity of my claim above that in contrast to Gehrig
and Rust and Hall’s models the equilibrium quantity traded is affected by the
presence or absence of search markets in my model, I also analyze the case with
a monopolistic intermediary and no search market.
The unconstrained intermediary’s profit as a function of q is then
Π(q) = (v − 2tq)q,
which is maximized by
q∗ =
v
4t
.
However, the additional constraint q∗ ≤ 12 has to be taken care of, so vt ≤ 2
has to hold for this solution to be valid. Otherwise, the equilibrium quantity is
simply 12 . To see that q
∗ > 14 , note that
v
4t
=
1
4
⇔ v
t
= 1,
which contradicts the assumption v > 32 t. Thus, the claim made above is indeed
valid.
6 Market Makers vs. Matchmakers
Up to now, the assumption was maintained that sellers are paid for providing
the good, regardless of whether a market maker attracts any buyers at all. This
”standing ready to buy” is a defining element of market makers, as witnessed by
the definition from the SEC quote above. On the up side, the assumption has
the advantage of eliminating coordination problems of buyers and sellers. The
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down side, though, is that it precludes many interesting applications. For ex-
ample, intermediaries in many markets do not actually buy goods to stock, but
rather make payments only when the transaction is completed. For example,
a job market intermediary typically only pays wages once a worker is matched
to a firm. Similarly, intermediaries in housing markets do typically not buy or
sell houses and apartments, but rather require a fee from buyers and/or sellers,
which becomes due only when a contract is written.25 Clearly, any customer
of such an intermediary will not only be concerned about the fees it charges,
but also about the number (and quality) of sellers and buyers it attracts. This
is why these types of intermediaries can be called matchmakers rather than
market makers. Recently, considerable research efforts have been devoted to
the study of matchmakers and platforms (see, e.g., Armstrong, 2004; Caillaud
and Jullien, 2001, 2003; McCabe and Snyder, 2004; Rochet and Tirole, 2003,
2004).
Though there are substantial differences between matchmakers and market
makers, there is also a great degree of similarity between the two types of
intermediary. In particular, I will show that every equilibrium in a game with
market makers is also an equilibrium in an ”appropriately defined” game with
matchmakers. I begin by introducing the game with matchmakers, whence it
should become clear what I mean by appropriately defined.
The Matchmaker Game Matchmakers charge fees φc ≥ 0 and φp ≥ 0 to
consumers and producers for joining their platform. I assume that these fees are
due when joining the matchmaker (or platform), i.e., before eventually being
matched. This assumption is made mainly for convenience, though it is not
completely innocuous.26 I also assume that each matchmaker sets an internal
transaction price of p = v2 at which a buyer and a seller on the platform exchange
the good. This is a simple way to make sure that a matchmaker generates the
same gross utility for buyers and sellers as a market maker if it attracts the
same buyers and sellers. In case the number of agents of one type (buyers or
sellers) exceeds the number of the other type, the agents on the short side are
matched with probability one, and those on the long side are matched with
a probability less than one.27 Buyers and sellers are uniformly distributed on
25An additional fee may also be charged to the seller to be admitted to the database of the
intermediary.
26If fees are only due in case a match occurs, then not joining a platform may be weakly
dominated by joining it, whereas this is not true when fees are charged upon joining a platform.
27For example, if there are 5 buyers and 3 sellers, each buyer is matched with probability
0.6.
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semicircles of length 12 and have transportation costs t. Gross utility is v for
every buyer, and matchmakers are located at W and E. There may or may
not be search markets in W and E as well. I assume also that in addition to
joining either search market and either intermediated market, all buyers and
sellers may remain inactive.
Before stating and proving the proposition, it is useful to note the connection
between the fees φc and φp set by matchmakers and ask and bid prices a and
b set by market makers. Let a > v2 and b <
v
2 be the prices set by a market
maker. Then, the fees
φc(a) ≡ a− v2 and φp(b) ≡
v
2
− b
are equivalent in the sense that they generate the same utility for buyers and
sellers, conditional on being matched with probability one. To see this, note
that the net utility of a buyer with utility vc from being served by the market
maker is
vc − a,
which equals the surplus of joining the matchmaker,
vc − φc − v2 ,
if φc = φc(a). Similarly, a seller with cost vp expects b − vp from a market
maker and v2 − φp − vp from a matchmaker if matched with certainty. The two
expressions are the same if φp = φp(b).
Denote by (a∗, b∗) the ask and bid prices in an equilibrium of the game with
market makers, and let IW∗ = (IW∗p , IW∗c ) and IE∗ = (IE∗p , IE∗c ) be the sets
of sellers and buyers joining the intermediary in W and E in this equilibrium.
Also, let SW∗ = (SW∗p , SW∗c ) and SE∗ = (SE∗p , SE∗c ) be the sets of sellers and
buyers joining the search market W and E in equilibrium. Note that the sets
SW∗ and SE∗ can be empty.
Proposition 6 The matchmaker game has a subgame perfect equilibrium, where
both matchmakers set
φc = φc(a∗) and φp = φp(b∗),
and where on the equilibrium path the buyers and sellers in IW∗ and IE∗ join
the matchmaker in W and E and the sellers and buyers in SW∗ and SE∗ join
the search markets in W and E.
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Proof : Note first that in any equilibrium, market makers make positive profits.
If buyers and sellers behave as stated in the proposition, then matchmakers will
thus make positive profits when setting φc(a∗) and φp(b∗). Second, from the
fact that the strategies of the buyers and sellers are an equilibrium in the game
with market makers, it follows that the actions of buyers and sellers in the
proposition are optimal in the game with matchmakers, given that all the other
buyers and sellers behave as stated. What therefore remains to be shown is
that the matchmakers cannot increase profits given the strategies played by
buyers and consumers. To see that buyers and sellers can deter any deviation
by a matchmaker, note that not joining any matchmaker if no one else joins a
matchmaker is a best response for every buyer and seller. Thus, if buyers and
sellers join the matchmakers if and only if these set φc = φc(a∗) and φp = φp(b∗),
and otherwise remain inactive or go to the search markets, deviation does not
pay for matchmakers either: A deviation yields zero profits, while the fees
φc = φc(a∗) and φp = φp(b∗) generate positive profits. ¥
7 Conclusions
In this paper, I analyzed duopolistic competition between market makers who
are horizontally differentiated and who may face competition from simultane-
ously active search markets. In equilibrium, market makers net positive profits,
which contrasts with competition between homogenous intermediaries (see, e.g.,
Stahl, 1988; Gehrig, 1993; Fingleton, 1997; Rust and Hall, 2003). Nonetheless,
the presence of active search markets reduces equilibrium profits of market
makers substantially.
Moreover, with active search markets, each intermediary nets a larger profit
and trades a larger quantity if there are two intermediaries than if there is a
single one. This result is similar to models of differentiated Bertrand competi-
tion in product markets, where equilibrium prices can increase as a second firm
enters. The reason is that competition increases the marginal willingness to pay
of buyers. In contrast to the standard product market model, though, in the
model with market makers and search markets, not only (consumer) prices but
also profits are larger with two intermediaries. This suggests that there may be
the potential for contagion insofar as the profit of a market maker decreases if
the other one goes bankrupt.
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Appendix
A Generalization for all values of v and t
In the text, I focussed on the case with vt >
3
2 . I now extend the model to
all values of v and t. First, I analyze the case when there are only market
makers. I show that the results from the product market models (Hotelling,
1929; Salop, 1979) carry over. Second, I introduce competition from search
markets. Though the case with intermediate values of v/t adds a few computa-
tional complications, I show that the basic results from the main text are valid
for all values of v/t.
A.1 Equilibrium without Search Markets
When there are no search markets, three classes of oligopolistic competition
exist as function of v and t: (i) local monopolies for small values of v/t, (ii) con-
strained duopoly for intermediate values of v/t and (iii) unconstrained duopoly
for large v/t. The unconstrained duopoly corresponds to the case analyzed in
the paper with ”large” meaning vt >
3
2 .
A.1.1 Local Monopolies
As local monopoly, each market maker has an equilibrium market coverage q
smaller than 14 . Consequently, buyers and sellers in [q,
1
2 ] will be inactive, and
the two market makers will act independently of one another. Consider the
market maker in W . Its profit function under local monopoly is
ΠW (q) = (v − 2tq)q,
which is maximized with q∗ = v4t . Since q
∗ < 14 is required,
v
t < 1 must hold.
Hence, for
0 <
v
t
< 1
the local monopoly case is relevant. Under local monopoly, equilibrium ask and
bid prices are
aLM∗ =
3
4
v and bLM∗ =
v
4
.
A.1.2 Constrained Duopoly
In the case of constrained duopoly, the buyer and seller at 14 are indifferent
between the intermediary in E and W , from which both get zero net utility
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(see also Salop, 1979). Hence, equilibrium prices are such that
v − t1
4
− aCD∗ = 0 and bCD∗ − t1
4
= 0.
Thus,
aCD∗ = v − t1
4
and bCD∗ = t
1
4
.
For aCD∗ < aLM∗ and bCD∗ > bLM∗ to hold, it must be true that
v
t
> 1.
Summarizing, we therefore have that for 0 < vt < 1, market makers are
local monopolies, for 0 < vt <
3
2 , they are a constrained duopoly, and for
3
2 <
v
t ,
they are an unconstrained duopoly. Note that this result replicates the result
for two imperfectly firms that interact only on a product market.
A.2 Equilibrium with Search Markets
Case 1: 1 < vt <
3
2 .
Note that 1 < vt implies that a buyer and a seller who are both located
at 12 would be willing to trade with one another even if they have to join the
search market in W . Consequently, the indifference constraint x̃(qW , qE) will
be the same as in the text, and thus the equilibrium with search markets will
be the same as for vt >
3
2 . Hence, in this model search markets do not only
impose additional constraints to eliminate a continuum of equilibria, but they
also eliminate the case of the constrained duopoly.
Case 2: 13 <
v
t < 1.
In this case, the search markets are still connected and no buyers and sellers
are inactive in equilibrium. However, there are some substantial complications
because utilities of the buyers and sellers who are indifferent between the two
search markets are now complicated, polynomial expressions. Nevertheless, I
can show that an equilibrium with active search markets exists, and I derive
the equilibrium quantity traded.
Because of symmetry, it is safe to assume that x̃ = ỹ will hold in equilibrium.
The expected utility of the buyer in the middle from joining the search markets
in W and E are
V Wc (x̃) =
1
4
1
x̃− qW
(
v − tx̃− tqW )2
and
V Ec (x̃) =
1
4
1
1
2 − x̃− qE
(
v − t(1
2
− x̃)− tqE
)2
.
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I first show that on the interval [qW , 12 − qE ] a unique fix point x̃(qW , qE) exists
such that
V Wc (x̃(q
W , qE)) = V Ec (x̃(q
W , qE))
holds. To see this, note that V Wc (x̃) approaches infinity as x̃ approaches q
W
from the right. Moreover, V Wc (x̃) is continuous and decreasing in x̃ and takes
a finite value at x̃ = 12 − qE . Similarly, V Ec (x̃) takes a finite value at x̃ = qW
and continuously increases in x̃ on [qW , 12 − qE ] and approaches infinity as
x̃ approaches 12 − qE from the left. Thus, a unique fix point x̃(qW , qE) ∈
[qW , 12 − qE ] exists.
There is no nice explicit solution for this fix point x̃(qW , qE). However, this
is not required since in equilibrium, qE = qW < 14 will hold. It is easy to see
that x̃(q, q) = 14 is the desired fix point.
28 What is needed in addition to that
is knowledge of the derivative ∂x̃(q
W ,qE)
∂qW
|qW =qE , which can be derived using the
implicit function theorem. For that purpose, some additional notation is useful.
Write V Wc (q
W , qE , x̃) and V Ec (q
E , qW , x̃) for the expected utility from search in
W and E, respectively, for the buyer at x̃, and denote the derivative after the
i-th argument by V Wci and V
E
ci , i = 1, 2, 3. Note that V
W
c2 = V
E
c2 = 0. By the
implicit function theorem, the partial derivative ∂x̃(q
W ,qE)
∂qW
satisfies
V Wc1 + V
W
c3
∂x̃(qW , qE)
∂qW
= V Ec3
∂x̃(qW , qE)
∂qW
.
Solving for ∂x̃(q
W ,qE)
∂qW
yields
∂x̃(qW , qE)
∂qW
=
V Wc1
V Ec3 − V Wc3
.
Though this is a rather cumbersome expression in general, it simplifies to
∂x̃(qW , qE)
∂qW
=
4tqW + 4v − 3t
2(4v + t− 12qW ) (51)
at qW = qE , which also implies x̃ = 14 .
The expected utility from search market participation of the buyer at qW is
V Wc (q
W ) =
1
2
[
v − tqW − 1
2
(tqW + tx̃(qW , qE))
]
,
so that the reservation price for buying from the intermediary is
AW (qW ) = v − tqW − V Wc (qW ).
28It is easy to see that it is a fix point. That it is the desired one follows then immediately
from its uniqueness.
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Similarly, for the seller at qW , expected utility from search is V Wp (q
W ) =
1
2
[
1
2(v − tqW + v − tx̃(qW , qE))− tqW
]
, so that the inverse supply function fac-
ing the intermediary in W is
BW (qW , qE) = V Wp (q
W ) + tqW .
Consequently, the intermediary’s profit is
ΠW (qW , qE) =
(
v − 2tqW − V Wc (qW )− V Wp (qW )
)
qW .
The condition for a profit maximum for the intermediary in W is
0 = v − 4tqW − ∂
(
V Wc (q
W ) + V Wp (q
W )
)
∂qW
qW − V Wc (qW )− V Wp (qW ).
Notice that
∂
(
V Wc (q
W ) + V Wp (q
W )
)
∂qW
= − t
2
∂x̃(qW , qE)
∂qW
.
Imposing symmetry, i.e., qW = qE , replacing x̃ by 14 and
∂x̃(qW ,qE)
∂qW
by 4tq
W +4v−3t
2(4v+t−12qW ) ,
the first order condition thus becomes
0 = −5
2
tqW +
1
8
t +
4tqW + 4v − 3t
4(4v + t− 12qW ) tq
W .
The two solutions to this quadratic equation are
qW∗1,2 =
38t + 72v ± 2√113t2 + 376vt + 1296v2
496t
.
It is easy to check that the relevant solution is the smaller one, i.e.,
qW∗ =
38t + 72v − 2√113t2 + 376vt + 1296v2
496t
,
which takes values between 0.046 and 0.051 for vt ∈
[
1
3 , 1
]
.
To verify that the second order conditions is satisfied at qW∗ = qE∗, observe
that the second order condition reads
0 ≥ −4t− 2∂
(
V Wc (q
W ) + V Wp (q
W )
)
∂qW
− ∂
2x̃
∂qW 2
qW = −4t + t ∂x̃
∂qW
+
t
2
∂2x̃
∂qW 2
qW .
The only way this condition could be violated is that
∂x̃
∂qW
+
1
2
∂2x̃
∂qW 2
qW > 4.
However, it can be checked that the left-hand side is strictly less than 14 for
1
3 <
v
t < 1. Thus, the second order condition is satisfied.
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Case 3: 0 < vt <
1
3 .
Consider now the case with vt <
1
3 . I am going to show that under this
condition there is an equilibrium such that the two search markets and conse-
quently the two intermediated markets are disconnected. In this equilibrium,
each market maker acts as a local monopolist who is constrained by the pres-
ence of a simultaneously open search market. This case is therefore analogous
to those analyzed by Gehrig (1993) and Rust and Hall (2003).
The search markets are disconnected if, say, the buyer at location x <
1
4 is indifferent between joining the search market in W and being inactive.
Similarly, if search markets are disconnected, a seller at some location y < 14 will
be indifferent between joining the search market in W and being inactive. Let
qW be the quantity traded by the intermediary in W . The seller with location
qW will be indifferent between joining the search market and trading with the
intermediary in W . Therefore, all sellers active in the search market will have
costs larger than tqW , so that no buyer at a location x, with v − tx ≤ tqW can
expect positive utility from search and will thus be inactive.29 Thus, the buyer
who is indifferent between joining the search market in W and being inactive
has location
x =
v
t
− qW .
Similarly, the seller with
y =
v
t
− qW
just breaks even when entering the search market.
Thus, the buyer at qW has an expected utility when joining the search
market in W of
V Wc (q
W ) =
1
2
[
v − tqW − 1
2
(
tqW + v − tqW )
]
=
1
4
(
v − 2tqW ) ,
so that the inverse demand function facing intermediary in W is
AW (qW ) =
3
4
v − 1
2
tqW .
Similarly, the expected utility of search for seller qW is
V Wp (q
W ) =
1
2
[
v − tqW − 1
2
(
tqW + v − tqW )
]
=
1
4
(
v − 2tqW ) ,
so that the inverse supply function facing the intermediary is
BW (qW ) =
1
4
v +
1
2
tqW .
29Like Gehrig (1993), I assume that buyers and sellers do not join a search market if their
expected utility of doing so is not positive. Alternatively, one could introduce a small, positive
fix cost of entering a search market.
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The profit of the intermediary W is
ΠW (qW ) =
(
1
2
v − tqW
)
qW ,
which is maximized at qW∗ = v4t . As x =
v
t − qW∗ must be smaller than 14 ,
3
4
v
t
<
1
4
⇔ v
t
<
1
3
has to hold.
B Proportional Rationing
I am now going to show that in the model with homogenous sellers and het-
erogenous buyers of section 3, the equilibrium ask price is a = v − 14 t if both
intermediaries have a capacity of 14 and if rationing is proportional. Note first
that if the other intermediary sets this ask price, there is no incentive for the
other one to set a lower price since the lower price would not increase quantity
sold. On the other hand, higher prices cannot be optimal either because demand
is price elastic. Thus, a = v − 14 t is a best response to itself. The remainder
of the argument is therefore only needed to show that no other prices can be
mutually best responses. The line of reasoning is as follows. Prices such that
ak < a−k ≤ v − 14 t cannot be set in equilibrium because intermediary k would
have an incentive to raise its price since for any price no larger than a−k the
quantity sold is 14 . Therefore, the only candidate prices for another equilibrium
are prices such that aW = aE < v− 14 t. As I will now show, such prices are not
consistent with equilibrium because each intermediary has an incentive to raise
its price. To see that, recall from footnote 10 that if there is random rationing
(and if a rationed buyer can join the other intermediary), the buyer who at ask
prices aW and aE is indifferent between the two intermediaries is the same as
the indifferent buyer if there is no rationing, i.e., x̃ = 14 +
aE−aW
2t is indifferent.
Without loss, assume aE ≤ aW . Then, the quantity demanded for intermediary
E is 12 − x̃ = 14 + a
W−aE
2t ≥ 14 , where 14 is the capacity constraint or stock of
intermediary E. Consequently,
α =
1
4
1
4 +
aW−aE
2t
=
t
t + 2(aW − aE) ,
which is weakly smaller than one.
With aW ≥ aE , the demand the intermediary in W faces consists of two
parts. First, all buyers with x ≤ x̃ will buy directly from W . Second, some
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consumers who get rationed at E are willing to buy from W at ask price aW .
Denote by x̂ the buyer who is indifferent between buying from W and not
buying at at all, i.e.,
x̂ =
v − aW
t
,
which is larger than x̃ for aW ≤ v − 14 t. Consequently, the fraction (1 − α) of
those consumers with x ∈ [x̃, x̂] will be rationed in E and will subsequently be
willing to buy from the market maker in W . Therefore, the demand function
it faces is x̃ + (1− α)(x̂− x̃) = αx̃ + (1− α)x̂.
The revenue of the intermediary in W is
RW (aW , aE) = aW (αx̃ + (1− α)x̂).
Differentiating RW (aW , aE) with respect to aW when aW = aE ≡ a yields
∂RW (aW , aE)
∂aW
|aW =aE=a=
t2 + 8a(v − a)
4t2
.
Obviously, this is greater than zero for all a ≤ v, and therefore for all a < v− 14 t.
Hence, it follows that for any aW = aE < v − 14 t either market maker has an
incentive to raise its price. Consequently, no prices other than aW = aE = v− 14 t
can be set in equilibrium.
C Proof of Proposition 4
Existence. I first show that the strategies mentioned in the proposition con-
stitute an equilibrium. It has already been shown in the text that given that
search markets exist where all buyers and sellers behave as stated, market mak-
ers’ prices are mutually best responses. It has also been shown that given these
prices and given the behavior of all other buyers and sellers, every buyer and
seller is best off playing the strategy assigned to him in the proposition. What
remains to be shown in order to prove existence is therefore that no market
maker has an incentive to unilaterally deviate and to extinguish the search
markets.
Consider the market maker in W who can ”kill” the search market by at-
tracting all buyers and sellers who are not attracted by the intermediary in E.
That is, intermediary W could set prices b̃W and ãW such that
b̃W − 10
26
t =
=b∗︷ ︸︸ ︷
1
2
v − 7
208
t− 3
26
t (52)
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and
v − ãW − 10
26
t = v −
=a∗︷ ︸︸ ︷(
1
2
v +
7
208
t
)
− 3
26
t, (53)
where the right-hand side of both equations is the net utility of the seller and
buyer at 1026 of patronizing the market maker in E. Solving for b̃
W and ãW
reveals that
b̃W =
1
2
v +
49
208
t >
1
2
v − 49
208
t = ãW .
In other words, the bid price required by this deviation exceeds the ask price.
Therefore, this deviation cannot be profitable.
However, there is a priori no reason why the intermediary should contend it-
self with symmetric strategies when attempting to extinguish the much disliked
search market. Similar to the model of Stahl (1988), it is in principle enough to
buy the whole stock in order to corner the market. Depending on the elasticity
of the demand function, it may then be in its best interest to sell less than it
bought. I am going to show now that even this asymmetric deviation strategy
is not profitable.
So as to see this, note first that the buyer with location q < 1026 is indifferent
between buying from the intermediary in W at aW and the intermediary in E
at a∗ if and only if
v − aW − tq = v − a∗ − t
(
1
2
− q
)
,
which after replacing a∗ by 12v +
7
208 t and re-arranging is seen to imply
ÃW (q) =
1
2
v +
111
208
t− 2tq
as the inverse demand function. The revenue maximizing quantity q̃∗ ≡ arg maxq AW (q)q
is therefore
q̃∗ =
104v + 111t
832t
.
The maximal revenue is
(104v + 111t)2
346112t
.
On the other hand, the expenditure required to buy the quantity 1026 is
b̃W · 10
26
=
5
26
v +
245
2704
t.
The deviation has already been shown not to pay for q̃∗ = 1026 , so only the case
with q̃∗ < 1026 needs to be considered further. But q̃
∗ < 1026 holds if and only if
v < 209104 t, whereas the deviation is profitable if and only if
(104v + 111t)2
346112t
−
(
5
26
v +
245
2704
t
)
≥ 27
2704
t.
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This in turn requires v to be larger than 4.4t. Thus, there is no feasible,
profitable deviation.
Uniqueness. The proof of uniqueness consists of three parts. I first show
that for given symmetric ask and bid prices â and b̂ that are the same in E and
W , where symmetry means that for any spread z ≥ 0
â =
v + z
2
and b̂ =
v − z
2
holds, there is a unique quantity q∗(z) traded by each intermediary. (Note
also that the prices a∗ and b∗ are symmetric.) Second, I show that there are
no equilibria where ask and bid prices are symmetric in E and W , but where
aW 6= aE (and bW 6= bE). Third, I show that there are no equilibria where an
intermediary sets asymmetric prices.
Claim I: For any spread z that is symmetric around v2 , there is a unique
quantity q∗(z) of sellers and buyers joining each intermediary.
Note: The concern here is that in principle there may be a coordination
problem between sellers and buyers because if more (high valuation) buyers are
active in the search market, search markets are more attractive for sellers. I will
show that because of the market maker’s commitment to buy any alternative
candidate equilibrium unravels.
Proof: For analytical ease, I assume that if there is rationing at an interme-
diary, the efficient rationing rule applies. That is, buyers and sellers who are
closer to an intermediary have priority over agents who are further away. This
assumption is not implausible if agents are served on a first come first serve
basis and if agents who are closer to an intermediary reach the intermediary
before others do. Buyers and sellers who are rationed can go back to the search
market.30
Assume qW = qE = q∗ and invert equation (43) to get quantity q∗(z) as a
function of the spread z (replacing ZW by z). It is easy to see that
q∗(z) =
1
4
− 2z
t
.
Step 1a: Given b̂ = v−z2 > 0, there is a unique y1 ∈ (0, q∗(z)] such that
all y ≤ y1 and all y ≥ 12 − y1 join the intermediaries in W and E even if all
buyers are active in the search market. The remainder of the argument applies
repeatedly the same two steps.
30If proportional (or random) rationing were assumed, then it is almost indispensable to
assume that rationed agents cannot go back to the search market because otherwise, expected
utility from search market participation is very hard to compute.
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Proof: Solve
V Wp (y1) =
1
2
[
1
2
(v + v − t1
4
)− ty1
]
= b̂− ty1
for y1 to get
y1 =
1
8
− z
t
=
1
2
q∗(z).
Note that the assumption x̃ = 14 has been implicitly used. Since initially,
i.e., before the set of sellers in [0, y1] and [12−y1] joined the intermediaries in W
and E, the two search markets are symmetric, the assumption is indeed correct.
Moreover, the search markets being symmetric after step 1a, the assumption
that ỹ = 14 is correct and can be used in step 1b. For the same reasons,
x̃ = ỹ = 14 will hold in any subsequent step.
Step 1b: Given â and that the y1 most efficient sellers leave the search
markets, there is a x1 ∈ (0, q∗(z)] such that all buyers with x ≤ x1 and all
x ≥ 12 − x1 join the intermediaries in W and E.
Proof: Here the efficient rationing rule comes to play a role. Solve
V Wc (x
′
1) =
1
2
[
v − tx′1 −
1
2
(ty1 + t
1
4
)
]
= v − tx′1 − â
for x′1 to get
x′1 =
1
8
− z
t
+
1
4
q∗(z) =
3
4
q∗(z) > y1.
However, since only the y1 < x′1 closest buyers will be served, only the y1 closest
buyers will leave the search market. So, let
x1 = y1.
Step 2a: Given steps 1a and 1b, there is a y2 ∈ (y1, q∗(z)] such that all
y ≤ y2 and all y ≥ 12 − y2 join the intermediaries in W and E even if all
remaining buyers are active in the search market.
Proof: Solve
V Wp (y2) =
1
2
[
1
2
(v − tx1 + v − t14)− ty2
]
= b̂− ty2
for y2 to get
y1 =
3
16
− 3
2
z
t
=
3
4
q∗(z).
Step 2b: Apply the same reasoning as in step 1b to establish that
x2 = y2.
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Step k: In general, after the k-th step, the buyers and sellers attracted by
an intermediary will be
yk =
k∑
i=1
(
1
2
)i
q∗(z).
Let k go to infinity and use the formula for a geometric sum to see that
y∞ ≡
∞∑
i=1
(
1
2
)i
q∗(z) = q∗(z).
Thus, there is a unique equilibrium with active search markets given symmetric
prices â, b̂. This completes the proof of claim I. ¥
Claim II: There are no equilibria where spreads are symmetric but different
in E and W . That is, there are no equilibria with zW 6= zE , zk being such that
ak = v+z
k
2 and b
k = v−z
k
2 , k = E, W .
Proof: Consider equation (43) and the corresponding equation for E, which
is
ZE(qE , qW ) = t
(
1
8
+
1
12
qW − 7
12
qE
)
.
The two first order conditions
0 = Zk
′
(qk, k−k)qk + Zk(qk, k−k)
for k = E, W have a unique solution, with qk = q−k. Accordingly, zW = zE
will hold. This completes the proof of claim II. ¥
Claim III: There are no equilibria with asymmetric spread(s).
Proof: Let y(b, a) and x(a, b) be the sellers and buyers joining the inter-
mediary in W who sets price a and b. Assume first that its prices a and b
are such that y(b, a) < x(a, b). Since the rationed buyers (who are located in
[y(b, a), x(a, b)]) will join the search market, increasing a until x(a, b) = y(b, a)
will unambiguously increase the profit of the intermediary.
So, assume that y(b, a) > x(a, b). Ruling out this case is not straightfor-
ward because increasing b and thereby decreasing y will make search market
participation more attractive for buyers, thus reducing their willingness to pay.
Put differently, one reason why an intermediary might choose prices a and b to
induce y(b, a) > x(a, b) is that this increases buyers’ reservation prices to buy
from the intermediary because search market participation is less attractive.
However, as I will show now, such a policy will never be optimal because it will
be in the interest of the intermediary to sell all the quantity it buys.
Denote by ÂW (x) the inverse demand function facing the intermediary in
W when inducing an unbalanced search market in W . Clearly, a necessary
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condition for the policy to be profitable is that it results in an outward shift of
this inverse demand function, i.e.,
ÂW (x) > AW (qW , qE)
must hold for x = qW , where AW (qW , qE) is as defined in (38). Denote q0 ≡
arg maxqW AW (qW , qE)qW . It is easy to see that
q0 =
6
7
v
t
+
3
28
+
1
14
qE .
Since vt >
3
2 , q0 >
1
2 follows (which of course is not feasible, but that is immate-
rial for the present argument). In other words, the intermediary would like to
sell more than its stock if there were no costs of acquiring stock (and neglecting
any other constraints). Now, because ÂW (x) > AW (qW , qE),
x0 ≡ arg max
x
ÃW (x)x > q0
follows. Since y(b, a) > x(a, b) holds by hypothesis, it will be both possible
and desirable to sell more than x(a, b) by adjusting prices to a′, b′ such that
y(b′, a′) = x(a′, b′) holds. Thus, the strategy (a, b) such that y(b, a) > x(a, b)
cannot be optimal.
The final thing to show is that y(b, a) = x(a, b) can only be achieved by
symmetric prices a = v+z2 and b =
v−z
2 . But the seller at location q
W will be
indifferent between selling to W at bW and joining the search market in W if
and only if
bW = BW (qW , qE) =
v
2
− 1
16
t− 1
24
tqE +
7
24
tqW ,
where BW (qW , qE) is the inverse supply function from equation (41). Similarly,
given ask price aW the buyer at qW is indifferent to buy from the intermediary
and participating in the search market if and only if
aW = AW (qW , qE) =
v
2
+
1
16
t +
1
24
tqE − 7
24
tqW ,
where AW (qW , qE) is the inverse demand function in (38). Clearly, aW = v+z2
and bW = v−z2 with z =
1
8 t+
1
12 tq
E− 712 tqW . Thus, given that the other interme-
diary attracts the same number of buyers and sellers (i.e., qE), an intermediary
can attract the same number of buyers and sellers qW if and only if it sets
symmetric prices. ¥
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D Less Than Fully Efficient Search Markets
Throughout the paper, I have maintained the assumption that search markets
are fully efficient. Full efficiency obtained because (i) all agents are matched
with probability one if the search markets are balanced and (ii) there are no
mismatches, i.e., all buyers and sellers exchange the good to the benefit of both
if matched. I now replace (i) and assume instead that in a balanced search
market, each agent is matched to an agent of the opposite type with probability
λ ∈ [0, 1].
If the search market is not balanced, say, because there are more buyers than
sellers, buyers are matched with probability γcλ < λ, while sellers are matched
with probability λ. This exercise is motivated by the observation that search
markets need not be as efficient as intermediated markets. It is also of interest
to see how changes in the search parameter λ affect equilibrium behavior. Apart
from capturing search frictions, the parameter λ can be interpreted as capturing
effects of legal and regulatory institutions. For example, one main reason why
in many countries firms have a preference to hire workers temporarily via inter-
mediaries is that hire (and fire) is much easier in this way than if they employed
workers themselves. Therefore, more restrictive labor laws would correspond to
a lower value of λ.
Reservation Prices of Buyers and Sellers It is easy to see that the only
relevant change of introducing the search friction λ ∈ [0, 1] is that the terms
in brackets in equations (19) and (20) have to be multiplied by λ. Thus, the
buyer and seller at qW who are indifferent between search market participation
and trading with the intermediary in W expect utility
Vc(qW ) =
λ
2
[
v − tqW − 1
2
(tqW + tx̃(qW , qE))
]
= λ
1
2
v − λt17
24
qW − λt 1
16
+ λt
1
24
qE
and
Vp(qW ) =
λ
2
[
v − tqW − 1
2
(tqW + tx̃(qW , qE))
]
= λ
1
2
v − λt17
24
qW − λt 1
16
+ λt
1
24
qE
from search market participation.
The indifference conditions are
v − tqW − aW = Vc(qW )
and
bW − tqW = Vp(qW ),
D LESS THAN FULLY EFFICIENT SEARCH MARKETS 50
yielding the inverse demand and supply functions
AW (qW , qE) =
2− λ
2
v −
(
1− 17
24
λ
)
tqW +
1
16
λt +
1
24
λtqE (54)
and
BW (qW , qE) =
λ
2
v +
(
1− 17
24
λ
)
tqW − 1
16
λt− 1
24
λtqE . (55)
Notice that AW (.) and BW (.) are not symmetric around v2 for λ < 1. As will
be seen shortly, this is of some importance for the model with less than fully
efficient search markets.
The profit of the intermediary in W is thus
ΠW (qW , qE) =
[
(1− λ)v − 2
(
1− 17
24
λ
)
tqW +
1
8
λt +
1
12
λtqE
]
qW .
The first order condition is
0 = (1− λ)v − 4
(
1− 17
24
λ
)
tqW +
1
8
λt +
1
12
λtqE ,
which can be solved for qW∗ using the symmetry qW∗ = qE∗ = q∗(λ) to get
q∗(λ) =
12
48− 35λ
[
(1− λ)v
t
+
λ
8
]
. (56)
Note that for λ = 1, q∗(λ) = 326 , which is as it ought to be.
The implied equilibrium prices are
a∗(λ) =
576v − 608vλ + 136vλ2 + 24λt− 17λ2t
16(48− 35λ)
and
b∗(λ) =
192v + 48vλ− 136vλ2 − 24λt + 17λ2t
16(48− 35λ) ,
so that equilibrium profits are
Π∗(λ) =
3
(
192v − 328vλ + 136vλ2 + 24λt− 17λ2t) (8v(1− λ) + λt)
16t(48− 35λ)2 .
It is easy to check that for λ = 1, a∗(λ) = v2 +
7
208 t, b
∗(λ) = v2 − 7208 t and
Π∗(λ) = 212704 t.
Notice though that for the search markets to be active,
q∗(λ) <
1
4
must hold. Solving q∗(λ) = 14 for λ yields the critical threshold value
λ∗(v/t) ≡
v
t − 1
v
t − 4148
. (57)
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Only for λ > λ∗ can the search markets be active. Note that because v/t > 3/2
is assumed, λ > 2431 ≈ 0.77 must hold for the search markets to be active.
In addition, it must also be the case that no intermediary has an incentive
to ”kill” the search market by attracting all the sellers 12 − q∗(λ) not attracted
by the other one. The relative attractiveness of this option depends on v in a
way that is not clear a priori. On the one hand, as v increases, q∗(λ) increases,
so that a smaller gap has to be bridged in order to extinguish the search market.
On the other hand, the profit Π∗(λ) also depends positively on v, which all else
equal runs counter the profitability of the deviation.
This deviation, say, by the intermediary in W , requires setting ask and bid
prices ã and b̃ such that
v − t
(
1
2
− q∗(λ)
)
− ã = v − tq∗(λ)− a∗(λ)
and
b̃− t
(
1
2
− q∗(λ)
)
= b∗(λ)− tq∗(λ).
Solving yields the deviation prices
ã =
960v − 992vλ + 136vλ2 + 352λt− 17λ2t− 384t
16(48− 35λ)
and
b̃ =
192v − 432vλ + 136vλ2 + 352λt− 17λ2t− 384t
16(48− 35λ) .
Therefore, the deviation profit Π̃ is
Π̃ = (ã− b̃)
(
1
2
− q∗(λ)
)
=
(−384t + 352λt + 576v − 712vλ + 136vλ2 − 17λ2t)(24t− 19λt− 12v + 12vλ)
8(48− 35λ)2t .
The equation Π∗(λ) = Π̃ has two solutions in v/t,
v
t
=
48− 41λ
48(1− λ) and
v
t
=
17λ2 − 328λ + 384
8(17λ2 − 65λ + 48) .
This confirms that increases in v/t have ambiguous effects on the profitability
of deviation. For all values in between, Π∗(λ) < Π̃ holds, so that deviation pays
for all
v
t
∈
[
48− 41λ
48(1− λ) ,
17λ2 − 328λ + 384
8(17λ2 − 65λ + 48)
]
,
while for all other values, Π∗(λ) > Π̃ holds, so that deviation does not pay.
However, notice that vt =
48−41λ
48(1−λ) is the inverse of λ
∗(v/t). So, the prices a∗(λ)
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Figure 5: Equilibrium with Active Search Markets Exists for all λ ∈ [λ∗, 1].
and b∗(λ) are an equilibrium if and only if
λ > λ∗
(v
t
)
⇔ v
t
<
48− 41λ
48(1− λ) .
Thus, the deviation is not profitable for those values of λ and vt for which
q∗(λ) < 14 holds; see Figure 5.
Finally, I have to check for asymmetric deviations where an intermediary
deviates to buy the whole stock 12 − q∗(λ) but sells less. Let W contemplate
this type of deviation and set a′. When the intermediary in E sets the ask price
a∗(λ), the buyer at the position x is indifferent between E and W whenever
v − tx− a′ = v − t
(
1
2
− x
)
− a∗(λ).
Thus, the inverse demand function the deviating intermediary in W faces is
A′(x) = a∗(λ) +
1
2
t− 2tx.
Maximizing A′(x)x over x yields as optimal quantity x∗ = a
∗(λ)
4t +
1
8 . It is easy
to check that x∗ > 12 − q∗. Thus, it will never be optimal not to sell all the
quantity the intermediary buys when deviating in this manner. Therefore, no
such deviation will be profitable.
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